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CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS-THE
ACCOUNTANTS' DILEMMA
CONSTANTINE N. KATSORIS*
I. THE CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
SINCE the turn of the century, the public accounting profession has
played an ever increasing role in the economic development of this
country. This expanding role is principally due to the following factors:
(i) the burgeoning size of modern industry has brought with it numerous
and complex problems requiring greater and more detailed financial anal-
ysis and assistance, (i) the ever increasing demand and reliance by lend-
ing institutions, investors and the government on accurate, independent
financial and economic reporting, and (iii) the adaptability of the
accounting profession in meeting business' need for newer and more
complex financial services beyond auditing and financial reporting,
namely, tax practice and management consulting.
Along with the rapid development of the profession came legislative
regulation, particularly dealing with the Certified Public Accountant
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "CPA"). The first such statute was
enacted in New York in 1896,1 and today, each state has legislation deal-
ing with the practice of accountancy. -2
The first accountancy laws were permissive-that is, they provided
that only persons who met certain educational and experience require-
ments and passed a written examination would be entitled to use the
CPA designation.3 These permissive statutes, however, contained no
restrictions on the use of titles such as "public accountant" or on the
right to engage in any phase of accounting practice, including the auditing
and certification of financial statements.4
Because such statutes left unregulated a large segment of persons who
were engaged in the practice of public accounting, many members of the
profession believed the permissive statutes were inadequate. This philos-
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; member of the New
York and Federal Bars.
1. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1896, ch. 312.
2. See 1 and 2 CCH Accountancy L. Rep.
3. Penney, The American Institute of CPAs-Past and Future, J. Accountancy, Jan. 1962,
p. 31, at 32.
4. Ibid.
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ophy, therefore, led to the passage in Maryland in 1924 of the first
regulatory accountancy statute.5
The basic philosophy underlying the regulatory accountancy statutes
is "that the independent audit function is so affected with the public
interest that all who engage in such practice should be required to meet
certain statutory standards of qualification and conduct." Generally,
these statutes strive to achieve this result by restricting the use of public
accounting titles and certain types of public practice to persons who meet
prescribed qualifications. 7
In all fifty states-whether the underlying accountancy statute is
permissive or regulatory-the use of the term "Certified Public Accoun-
tant" is limited to those who have met certain qualifications. Present
requirements for each of these states include the passage of the same
uniform CPA examination. This achievement of voluntary uniformity by
fifty state legislatures in restricting the use of the title of CPA to those
who have passed said examination not only has had a profound influence
on educational standards,' but also clearly hallmarks the CPA as supreme
in his profession;0 consequently, the balance of this article will concern
itself principally with the CPA.
In the past two decades, the CPA profession has numerically increased
at a remarkable rate."° This dynamic growth is due not only to the sub-
stantial expansion of the national economy itself, but also to an increased
demand for the CPA's services in fields other than accounting and audit-
ing (namely, taxation and management consulting)" and the enjoyment
of an excellent reputation for professional integrity.'2 This combination
of integrity and competence in a wide variety of financial matters has
catapulted the CPA into the select circle of confidants entrusted by most
businessmen with the innermost of secrets.
If a CPA can be forced to involuntarily reveal these confidences before
some future forum, his client will necessarily be hesitant to make full
disclosure to him, thus hampering the CPA's usefulness in solving his
client's problems. Of vital importance, therefore, to the nurturing of this
relationship is the extent to which these confidences are protected as
privileged communications.
5. Md. Laws 1924, ch. 585.
6. Heimbucher, Fifty-three Jurisdictions, J. Accountancy, Nov. 1961, p. 42, at 43.
7. Ibid.
8. Penney, supra note 3, at 33.
9. See Carey, The CPA Plans for the Future 485 (1965).
10. See text accompanying notes 79-82 infra.
11. See Carey, op. cit. supra note 9, at 120-27; Solomon, Accounting in the Next Decade,
J. Accountancy, Jan. 1965, p. 22.
12. See Carey, op. cit. supra note 9, at 311.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE OF
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
Unlike rules of exclusion (e.g., the hearsay rule) which have as their
common purpose the ascertainment of truth by guarding against evidence
which is unreliable or calculated to prejudice or mislead, the evidential
privilege of confidential communications does not in any way aid in this
quest for truth.13 Instead, its sole purpose is the protection of interests
and relationships which "are regarded as of sufficient social importance
to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the
administration of justice." 4 Countered against this need for the fostering
of certain interests and relationships is the "general duty to give what
testimony one is capable of giving and that any exemptions which may
exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive
general rule ... ."' Consequently, four fundamental conditions are gen-
erally considered essential to the establishment of a privilege against the
disclosure of communications:" (1) the communications must originate
in a confidence that will not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidential-
ity must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the rela-
tion between the parties; (3) the relation must be one which, in the
opinion of the community, ought to be sedulously fostered; and, (4) the
injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the proper
disposal of litigation.
Such a privilege was generally recognized at common law for confi-
dential communications between spouses, 7 and also those between an
attorney and his client."8 Moreover, although no such privilege existed
at common law for communications between (i) the physician and
patient 9 and (ii) the priest and penitent," the privilege has been ex-
tended to these relationships by broad statutory enactment.
No accountant-client privilege was generally recognized at common
law; 21 however, approximately fourteen states have enacted legislation
recognizing some form of such privilege. This article, therefore, will
13. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Texas L. Rev. 447
(1938).
14. Id. at 448.
15. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
16. Id. § 2285, at 527.
17. Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897).
18. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1960).
19. McCormick, Evidence § 101, at 211 (1954).
20. 8 Wigrnore, op. cit. supra note 15, § 2285, at 528.
21. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 US. 864
(1953).
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generally analyze the extent to which confidential communications be-
tween a CPA and his client are privileged.
III. THE EXTENSION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
TO THE ACCOUNTANT
There has been a relatively current expansion of the attorney-client
privilege to include confidential communications between a client and
his accountant. 22 This extension is basically interposed when the accoun-
tant is found to be in the employ of the attorney; however, there is some
conflict regarding the circumstances under which this privilege applies
to accountants.
23
Attempts at such expansion, however, were rejected as recently as
seventeen years ago when the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Himmelfarb v. United States,4 denied the extension of the attorney-client
privilege to the accountant on the ground that his presence at attorney-
client conferences was not "indispensable in te sense that the presence
of an attorney's secretary may be."2 5 Moreover-although the accountant
was engaged by the attorney to assist in the preparation of the defense
of the client's income tax evasion case-the court reasoned that the
accountant was merely "a convenience which, unfortunately for the ac-
cused, served to remove the privileged character of whatever communica-
tions were made.""2
Two years after Himmelfarb, the court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in Gariepy v. United States2 --in affirming an accused's conviction for
income tax evasion-stated that an accountant's testimony was not
privileged, because there was no evidence that the accountant was em-
ployed by the accused's counsel when he received the confidential com-
munications. Regardless of this issue of employment, however, the court
further reasoned, citing Himnmelfarb, that "there is respectable authority
that denies him the privilege status."2
Some ten years after the Gariepy case, however, the court of appeals
for the Second Circuit, in United States v. Kovel,2" rejected the rationale
of Himmelfarb, stating:
We cannot regard the privilege as confined to "menial or ministerial" employees.
Thus, we can see no significant difference between a case where the attorney sends a
22. See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Kovel, 296
F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
23. Annot., 96 AL.R.2d 125, 131-32 (1964).
24. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
25. Id. at 939.
26. Ibid.
27. 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951).
28. Id. at 463-64.
29. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
[Vol. 35
ACCOUNTANTS' PRIVILEGE
client speaking a foreign language to an interpreter to make a literal translation of
the client's story; a second where the attorney, himself having some little knowledge
of the foreign tongue, has a more knowledgeable non-lawyer employee in the room to
help out; a third where someone to perform that same function has been brought along
by the client; and a fourth where the attorney, ignorant of the foreign language,
sends the client to a non-lawyer proficient in it, with instructions to interview the
client on the attorney's behalf and then render his own summary of the situation,
perhaps drawing on his own knowledge in the process, so that the attorney can give
the client proper legal advice ...
This analogy of the client speaking a foreign language is by no means irrelevant
to the appeal at hand. Accounting concepts are a foreign language to some lawyers
in almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers in some cases. Hence the presence of
an accountant, whether hired by the lawyer or by the client, while the client is
relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought not destroy the privilege, any
more than would that of the linguist in the second or third variations of the foreign
language theme discussed above; the presence of the accountant is necessary, or at
least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer
which the privilege is designed to permit.
30
In the Kovel case, the accountant seeking to invoke the privilege was
in the employ of the client's lawyers. In the later case of United States
v. Judson,3 1 the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit further extended
the attorney-client privilege to materials prepared by an accountant who
was hired by the client at the request of the attorney for the purpose of
preparing the client's net worth statement for the attorney's use in a pend-
ing income tax investigation of the client. The court therein reasoned that
it was immaterial whether the client or the attorney hired the accountant,
so long as it was at the attorney's request and not before the client had
consulted with the attorney. It thus appears that the Ninth Circuit has
reversed the rationale of the Himmeljarb case.'
Moreover, before the attorney-client privilege will apply to an "ac-
countant-employee," it is imperative that said accountant was assisting
an attorney in the performance of the latter's rendering of legal services
to the client. If the attorney himself was acting in a non-legal capacity,
such privilege would be inapplicable to communications made to the
attorney as well as the accountant.3 3
IV. STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF ACcOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Since there was no accountant-client privilege recognized at common
law, several jurisdictions have passed legislation recognizing such an
30. Id. at 921-22. (Footnote omitted.)
31. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
32. Comment, Accountants, Privileged Communications, and Section 7602 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 10 St. Louis U.L.J. 252, 259 (1965).
33. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961), 30 Fordham L. Rev. 809
(1962).
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exemption.34 Although there is no such federal legislation, fourteen states
and Puerto Rico presently have such statutes. 5 However, despite the
34. Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 670 & n.4 (1954).
35. Arizona: "Certified public accountants and public accountants practicing In this state
shall not be required to divulge, nor shall they voluntarily divulge information which they
have received by reason of the confidential nature of their employment .... [Blut this sec-
tion shall not be construed as modifying, changing or affecting the criminal or bankruptcy
laws of this state or the United States." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-749 (Supp. 1966).
Colorado: "A certified public accountant shall not be examined without the consent of his
client as to any communication made by the client, to him in person or through the media of
books of account and financial records, or his advice, reports or working papers given or
made thereon in the course of professional employment .... " Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 153-1-7(b) (1953).
Florida: "All communications between certified public accountants and public accountants
and the person for whom such certified public accountant or public accountant shall have
made any audit or other investigation in a professional capacity, and all information obtained
by certified public accountants and public accountants in their professional capacity concern-
Ing the business and affairs of clients shall be deemed privileged communications in all of the
courts of this state . . . ." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 473.15 (1965).
Georgia: "Any communications to any practicing certified public accountant transmitted
to such accountant in anticipation of, or pending, the employment of such accountant shall
be treated as confidential and not disclosed nor divulged by said accountant in any proceedings
of any nature whatsoever." Ga. Code Ann. § 84-216 (1955).
Illinois: "A public accountant shall not be required by any court to divulge information or
evidence which has been obtained by him in his confidential capacity as a public accountant."
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110 1/2, § 51 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
Iowa: "The information acquired by registered practitioners ... in the course of professional
engagements shall be deemed confidential and privileged ... provided, however, that nothing
contained in this section shall be construed to modify, change, or otherwise affect the
criminal or bankruptcy laws of this state or of the United States." Iowa Code Ann.
§ 116.15 (1949).
Kentucky: "A certified public accountant or public accountant shall not be required by any
court to divulge information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his confidential
capacity as such." Ky. Rev. Stat. § 325.440 (1962).
Louisiana: "No certified public accountant, public accountant, or person employed by
certified public accountant or public accountant, shall be required to, or voluntarily disclose
or divulge, the contents of any communication made to him by any person employing him to
examine, audit, or report on any books, records, or accounts ... except by express permission
of the person employing him or his heirs, personal representative or successors." La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §37:85 (1964).
Maryland: "Except by express permission of the person employing him . . . a certified
public accountant or public accountant or any person employed by him shall not be required
to . . . disclose or divulge the contents of any communication made to him by any person
employing him to examine, audit or report on any books, records, accounts or statements nor
any information derived therefrom in rendering professional service; provided that nothing In
this section shall be taken or construed as modifying, changing or affecting the criminal laws
of this state or the bankruptcy laws." Md. Ann. Code art. 75A, § 20 (1965).
Michigan: "Except by written permission of the client . . . a certified public accountant,
or a public accountant . . . shall not be required to, and shall not voluntarily, disclose or
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recognition by each of these statutes of some form of accountant-client
privilege, there exists an over-all lack of uniformity in approach and
scope. Although other differences exist, the basic underlying variances
prevalent among these statutes are in the following three areas:"
(1) some profess to apply to all matters generally, whereas others specif-
ically exclude situations involving criminal or bankruptcy matters;
(2) some extend the privilege solely to CPAs, whereas others include
"Public Accountants" or variations thereof; and, (3) some profess to
apply generally to all of the accountant's services, whereas many specifi-
cally exclude certain types of services.
Because such accountant privilege statutes are in a distinct minority,
even their cumulative effect falls far short of offering complete protection.
Moreover, conventional problems of conflicts of laws complicate the effect
of such statutes-particularly for those accountants whose practices are
not limited to one state. For example, assume an action is brought in a
state court of X (which has no accountant privilege statute) based on
divulge information of which he or she may have become possessed relative to and in
connection with any examination of, audit of, or report on, any books, records, or accounts
which he or she may be employed to make.. . .Provided, however, That nothing in this
paragraph shall be taken or construed as modifying, changing or affecting the criminal or
bankruptcy laws of this state or of the United States.' Mlich. Comp. Laws § 338.523 (1948).
(Italics omitted.)
Nevada: "An accountant cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment .... ." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.065 (1963).
New Mexico: "A certified or registered public accountant shall not be required by any
court to divulge information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his confidential
capacity as such ... ." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-23-26 (1953).
Pennsylvania: "Except by permission of the client ... a certified public accountant ...
shall not be required to, and shall not voluntarily, disclose or divulge information of which
he may have become possessed relative to and in connection with any professional services
as a certified public accountant other than the examination of, audit of or report on any
financial statements, books, records or accounts which he may be engaged to make or
requested by a prospective client to discuss.... Provided, however, That nothing herein shall
be taken or construed as modifying, changing or affecting the criminal or bankruptcy laws of
this Commonwealth or of the United States." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 9.11a (Supp. 1965).
Puerto Rico: "No court shall require a certified public accountant or public accountant
to divulge information or evidence obtained by him in his confidential capacity as such."
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 20, § 790 (1961).
Tennessee: "Certified public accountants practicing in this state shall not divulge nor
shall they in any manner be required to divulge, any information which may have been
communicated to them or obtained by them by reason of the confidential nature of their
employment. . . . Except that nothing in any section of this chapter shall be con-
strued as modifying, changing, or affecting the criminal and bankruptcy laws of this state
or the United States., Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-114 (1955).
36. See Levy, Accountants' Legal Responsibility 63-64 (1954).
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a cause of action arising in state Y (which has a general accountant
privilege statute). The question of whether state X will enforce the
privilege granted by state Y is not totally clear. It might depend on
whether state X considers privileged communication statutes to be proce-
dural or substantive. a7 Instead of such arbitrary and mechanical "charac-
terization of the privilege as a matter of substance or procedure," it has
been suggested that the only feasible test for recognition of such a
privilege in conflicts cases is "that of reasonable reliance."88, As stated by
Professor Ehrenzweig:
Thus, a man, in the course of negotiating a contract with another, may have
confided to his wife in reasonable reliance on the law of their marital domicile.
Should his opponent be permitted to coerce her testimony under "the law of the
contract"? Presumably the privilege accorded to her under the law of her domicile
is designed to encourage and protect free disclosure among spouses. What justification
could there be for infringing upon this privilege under any other law? 0
Then again, the solution to the problem has been suggested to revolve
around the law of the state which has the most significant relationship
with the communication." In determining which state has the "most
significant relationship," the following guidelines have been proposed:
The state which has the most significant relationship with a communication will
usually be the state where the communication took place, which . . . is the state
where an oral interchange between persons occurred, where a written statement
was received or where an inspection was made of a person or thing. The communication
may take place in a state different from that whose local law governs the rights and
liabilities of the parties. So in a case involving a contract that is governed by the
local law of state X ... a question of privilege may arise with respect to a communica-
tion that took place in state Y.
The state where the communication took place will be the state of most significant
relationship in situations where there was no prior relationship between the parties
to the communication. If there was such a prior relationship between the parties,
the state of most significant relationship will be that where the relationship was
centered unless the state where the communication took place has substantial
contacts with the parties and the transaction. So if husband and wife are domiciled
in state X and the wife makes a statement to the husband in state Y while the
spouses are spending a weekend in the latter state, X is the state which has the
37. See Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another jurisdic-
tion, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 535 (1956).
38. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 356 (1962).
39. Ibid.
40. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 599b (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965) provides
that: "(1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state which has the most
significant relationship with the communication will be admitted, even though it would be
privileged under the local law of the forum, unless the admission of such evidence would be
contrary to the strong policy of the forum. (2) Evidence that is privileged under the local
law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the communication but which
is not privileged under the local law of the forum will be admitted unless there Is some special
reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be given effect."
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most significant relationship with the communications. Y, on the other hand, might
be the state of most significant relationship if the spouses spent a considerable portion
of their time there. 41
Moreover, whether federal courts must follow the law of the forum
state with respect to privileged communications has caused even more
confusion.42 Insofar as the federal courts are concerned, however, the
problem must be approached differently, depending on whether the action
involves diversity jurisdicition, or if a federal question is involved.
In diversity jurisdiction the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins4 3 basically
requires the federal courts to apply the substantive law of the forum
state, leaving procedural matters therein to be decided by federal law."
If held to be substantive, then the federal courts under Erie must apply
state law to determine the matter of privilege, whereas if it is held to be
procedural, Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should
determine its admissibility.45 This distinction, however, is not made with-
out difficulty, and there is considerable confusion in the decisions as to
the application of the Erie rule and the Federal Rules to state evidentiary
privileges.46 Although there is some authority holding that a federal court
in a diversity action is not bound to enforce a confidential communication
recognized by state law,47 the majority rule appears to be that, in such
actions, the federal courts must enforce a confidential communication
privilege recognized by the forum state.48
In logically discussing federal non-diversity cases, separate analysis is
necessary of those cases involving federal criminal jurisdiction and those
involving federal civil questions. As to federal criminal jurisdiction, it
has been held that a federal court is not bound to follow a confidential
communication privilege recognized by the forum state."0 The rule in-
41. Id., comment e at 234-35. (Footnote omitted.)
42. See Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, Fisher v.
Pierce, 351 U.S. 965 (1956), which dealt with the question of the applicability of a privilege
to a deposition where a diversity action was pending in a state which did not recognize said
privilege, with the deposition being taken in a state recognizing the privilege. In Application
of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), a similar question was involved in which the
diversity action was pending in a state which did recognize such a privilege, with the
deposition of the witness being taken in a state which did not recognize said privilege.
43. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
44. For a recent discussion of the Erie case, see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
45. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 320, 330 (1964). Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) is discussed in text
accompanying notes 51-70 infra.
46. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 465 (2d Cir. 1962).
47. Annot, 95 A.L.R.2d 320, 327 (1964).
48. Id. at 330. The predominant ground for this majority view is that the court finds the
privilege to be a matter of substance. However, in some cases the basis of the holding is (i)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) or some other federal statute, (ii) that state statutory law must be
followed, or (iii) not explicitly stated. Id. at 330-31.
49. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 n.2 (2d Cir. 1961). This court indicated
1966]
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volving federal civil non-diversity questions, however, finds less unanimity
among the federal circuits.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the procedure in the
United States district courts and apply "in all suits of a civil nature
whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the
exceptions stated in Rule 81 "" Rule 43(a) provides:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by these rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible
under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore
applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under
the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in
which the United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors
the reception of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented according
to the most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which
reference is herein made. The competency of a witness to testify shall be determined
in like manner.51
Rule 43 (a) is a rule of admission and not of exclusion and is intended
to liberalize admissibility of testimony; consequently, state rules of
admissibility are generally controlling in federal courts, whereas state
exclusionary rules are not.52 Evidence admissible, therefore, either as a
result of federal statute or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied
in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity must
be received even though state courts would hold otherwiseY3 In the case
of privileged communications, however, questions often arise where state
law exdludes the evidence as privileged, and there is no federal statute or
precedent allowing discovery. 4 Accordingly, although there is authority
to the contrary,5 it is generally held that privileged communications are
principally controlled in federal civil non-diversity actions "by state
that such state-recognized privileges are probably also inapplicable in federal grand jury pro-
ceedings. Moreover, Fed. R. Crim. P. 26 states that "in all trials the testimony of witnesses
shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by
these rules. The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses
shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience."
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a). (Emphasis added.)
52. 5 Moore, Federal Practice Uf 43.04, at 1319 (2d ed. 1964).
53. Id. at 1327.
54. 4 id. U 26.23(9), at 1483 n.7 (2d ed. 1963).
55. See Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 320, 337 (1964), citing United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276
(6th Cir. 1952); Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 849 (1945); Mariner v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 202 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ohio
1962); and Fahey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The Mariner decision
recognized that, although federal courts should respect state statutes on privilege, they should
be free to give their own interpretation to the concept of privilege.
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statutes... if no federal statutes or rules of court contrary to the state
statutes are enacted or promulgated .... 51
Of possibly greatest significance to the CPA, however, is the discord
among the federal circuits on the issue of whether an administrative hear-
ing under section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code and subsequent
court action to enforce a summons issued pursuant to that section, is a
"civil action" covered by state law under Rule 43(a), or covered by
federal law. 7 In analyzing the cases hereunder involving the privilege of
confidential communications, it should be noted that some deal with
privileges other than accountant-client, and the suggestion has been made
to distinguish such cases on the ground that different privileges are
involved."' Such distinctions, however, seem insignificant for our pur-
poses because the basic underlying problem in all of them was whether
state or federal law applied.59
The Fifth Circuit, in Falsone v. United States,60 refused to apply a
Florida statute creating an accountant-client privilege and compelled an
accountant served with a summons by an internal revenue agent (i) to
testify before said agent concerning the tax liability of one of the accoun-
tant's clients and (ii) to bring with him all documents relating to the
client's income tax returns. In drawing a distinction between the adminis-
56. 5 Moore, Federal Practice II 43.07, at 97 (Supp. 1965). (Footnotes omitted.) See
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). An example of a contrary federal statute is
Bankruptcy Act § 21(a), 52 Stat. 852 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1964), which generally
abolishes the spousal privilege in bankruptcy matters. As to other bankruptcy matters,
however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generally made applicable by General
Order 37, 11 U.S.C. App. (1964), although Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a) provides, inter alia, that
those rules "do not apply to proceedings in bankruptcy . . . except insofar as they may be
made applicable thereto by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States."
57. Report on Attorney-Client Privilege Study, ABA Bull., Section of Taxation,
April 1965, p. 83, at 109. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602 provides: "For the purpose of
ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made,
determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law
or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue
tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-(l) To
examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such
inquiry; (2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books
of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required
to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to
appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to
produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath,
as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and (3) To take such testimony of the
person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry."
58. See United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 927 (ED. Ky. 1962).
59. Comment, Accountants, Privileged Communications, and Section 7602 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 10 St. Louis U.L.J. 252, 254 (1965).
60. 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
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trative proceeding there involved and the court action to enforce the
summons, the court stated:
Appellant insists that this is a civil case, and, as such, subject to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure . . . and, further, that under those rules the competency and
privilege of witnesses is governed by state laws. . . Both insistences might be
conceded and it still would not follow that the privilege provided by the Florida
statute would be applicable to appellant's testimony before the Internal Revenue
agent under 26 U.S.C.A. § 3614. Appellant has failed to observe the important distinc-
tion between the administrative proceeding under that section and the court action to
enforce the summons under 26 U.S.C.A. § 3633 (a). Rule 81(a)(3) makes the Rules
of Civil Procedure applicable to "proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or
production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or
agency of the United States . . . ." That means that the rules are applicable to
the court action to enforce the summons under 26 U.S.C.A. § 3633(a). To contend
that the proceeding itself before the Commissioner or the Internal Revenue agent
is also a civil case subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and particularly to Rule
43(a) as to the admissibility of evidence, would be going too far. For, speaking
generally, the system of rules of evidence in force for trials by jury or even in courts
of equity is not applicable, either by historical precedent, or by sound practical
policy, to inquiries of fact determinable by administrative tribunals or officers. 01
In the same year as Falsone, the Second Circuit in In re Albert Lindley
Lee Memorial Hospital2 rejected the application of a New York statute
recognizing a physician-patient privilege and similarly held that the
admissibility of evidence in an income tax investigation is to be decided
by federal law, stating:
But determination of what evidence is admissible in an income tax investigation
authorized by 26 U.S.C.A. § 3614(a) is a matter to be decided according to federal
law. Such investigatory inquiry by a Government agent is not a judicial proceeding.
As we said in Bolich v. Rubel, 2 Cir., 67 F.2d 894, 895, "It is strictly inquisatorial,
justifiable because all the facts are in the taxpayer's hands." Even administrative
agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, the Labor Board and the Interstate
Commerce Commission have never been restricted by the rigid rules of evidence
applicable in courts of law. As pointed out in Torras v. Stradley, D.C.N.D. Ga., 103
F. Supp. 737, 739, there is even less reason to restrict the revenue agent's inquiry by
technical rules of evidence. We agree, therefore, with the decision in Falsone v.
United States, that neither state statute prohibiting the use of privileged communica-
tions in court actions nor Rules 81(a)(3) and 43(a) are applicable to the investigatory
inquiry by a revenue agent pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. § 3614(a).63
Some seven years after the Falsone and Lindley cases, however, the
Ninth Circuit in Baird v. Koerner 4 applied the privileged communica-
tions rules of the forum state in reversing a judgment of civil contempt
arising out of the refusal of an attorney to reveal the name of his client
61. Id. at 741-42. (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.) (Citations omitted.)
62. 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954).
63. Id. at 123-24. (Footnotes omitted.) (Citation omitted.)
64. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
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to an internal revenue agent. In ruling that it involved a "civil case,"
to which Rule 43(a) applied, the court in Baird concluded:
In summation, we find (1) that because the relationship of client and attorney is
created and controlled by the law of the various states; and that such creation and
control is recognized, followed, and approved by the federal courts, the nature and
extent of the privilege created between a lawyer and his client by the attorney-client
relationship requires the federal courts to follow the state law; (2) that some
considerable number of federal cases enunciate the rule that the state law governs
the rule of privilege; (3) that some federal cases apply the law of the forum state,
but do so without enunciating the principle under which they act; (4) that no
federal statute forbids the use of the law of the forum state, and that if there is any
definite rule set up by federal statute, it requires us to follow the law of the forum
state, and (5) any federal "common law" which may exist does not require us to
ignore the forum state law .. .5
Soon after Baird, the Seventh Circuit in FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co."
-in applying the Falsone rationale to a subpoena of the Federal Trade
Commission-attempted to reconcile the inconsistency between the Baird
and Falsone cases as follows:
Baird v. Koerner is distinguishable from the case at bar because the appeal there
was from a judgment of civil contempt against an attorney for his refusal to comply
with a District Court order to identify, in an Internal Revenue Service inquiry, his
client. We agree with that court that that case was ". . . . a civil case." p. 628.
The Falsone appeal was not from a judgment of contempt but, although an Internal
Revenue proceeding, was from an order similar to the one before us. There is no
inconsistency, therefore, between the view of the court in Baird v. Koerner and the
decision in Falsone that such an administrative proceeding is not a civil case.G7
Irrespective of whether this distinction is valid, barely one month after
St. Regis, the Second Circuit in Colton v. United States0 -in considering
the question of what law applies to questions of privilege in a federal in-
come tax investigation-rejected Baird, stating:
At the outset, we reiterate our view, stated in In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial
Hospital ...that questions of privilege in a federal income tax investigation are
matters of federal law. See Falsone v. United States . . . For the reasons stated in
our Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital opinion, we do not agree with the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Baird v. Koerner ... that a hearing held by the Internal
Revenue Service under § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is a "civil action"
governed by state evidence law under Rude 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 US.C.A., or that state law should govern for any other reasoncs
As a practical matter, this problem is more acute in situations involving
the accountant-client privilege, or other similar privileges which exist
65. Id. at 632.
66. 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962).
67. Id. at 734-35. (Citation omitted.) See also Reisman v. Caplin, 375 US. 440 (1964).
68. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
69. Id. at 636. (Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.)
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solely as a result of state statutes, than in the case of the attorney-client
privilege which was recognized at common law."° It has been suggested
that Colton is the better reasoned decision, because it results in uniformity
which "is desirable in the application of the attorney-client privilege in
tax investigations."' However, until the discrepancy between Colton and
Baird is reconciled, it is not clear to what extent a state created account-
ant-client privilege would apply in an Internal Revenue administrative
proceeding and subsequent court action relating to a summons issued
therein.
V. EFFORTS TOWARD BETTER PROTECTION
In view of (i) the non-recognition of an accountant-client privilege at
common law,72 (ii) state statutes recognizing such a privilege are in a
distinct minority (14 out of 50)73 and (iii) the uncertain effect such
statutes have in other jurisdictions,74 it is axiomatic that confidential
communications to an accountant-unless he comes under the attorney's
umbrella--are not secure from disclosure. Such protection can come
only by federal legislation and statutory enactment by all the states.
Such a mammoth legislative undertaking, however, is by no means a
simple task. There are numerous problems to be overcome, the least
insignificant of which is general reluctance to extend the present scope
of the privilege of confidential communications. Indeed, it has been
expressed that "the tendency is not to extend the classes to whom the
privilege from disclosure is granted, but to restrict that privilege.""0
Moreover, a patronizing report of the American Bar Association's Com-
mittee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence in 1937-38-in dis-
cussing so-called "novel privileges"-stated:
Of recent years, there have appeared on the statute book of several legislatures
certain novel privileges of secrecy. Their history has not been traced; but they bear
the marks of having been enacted at the instances of certain occupational organizations
of semi-national scope. The demand for these privileges seems to have been due, in
part to a pride in their organization and a desire to give it some mark of professional
status, and in part to the invocation of a false analogy to the long-established
privileges for certain professional communications.
The analogies are not convincing (though this is not the place for a demonstration).
Moreover, the tendency is an unwholesome one. Yet it threatens to spread not only
to other legislatures but to other occupations. The correct tendency would rather be
to cut down scope of the existing privileges, instead of to create any new ones. We
70. See Report on Attorney-Client Privilege Study, supra note 57, p. 111.
71. United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324, 326 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
72. Note 21 supra and accompanying text.
73. See statutes cited note 35 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 34-71 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 22-33 supra.
76. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 295, 199 N.E. 415, 416 (1936).
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recommend that the legislatures refuse to create any new privileges for secrecy
of communications in any occupation; and particularly we recommend against any
further recognition of
(A) Privilege for information obtained by Accountants;
(B) Privilege for information obtained by Social Workers;
(C) Privilege for information obtained by Journalists. 77
As has been pointed out, after this report, significantly, "both the Model
Code of Evidence, adopted in 1942 by the American Law Institute, and
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, approved in 1953 by the National Con-
ference on Uniform State Laws, excluded all of the so-called novel
privileges."7
8
Since the time of the writing of this report, however, the CPA pro-
fession has had an era of exceptional growth in its membership, a broad-
ening in the scope of its services, and a formidable upgrading of its
professional status.
Between 1950 and 1960 the aggregate number of CPAs in the United
States had grown from 38,000 to 69,200, an increase of 82%; a growth
rate in excess of three times that of either lawyers and judges, or physi-
cians and surgeons during the comparable period.7" By 1964 the aggregate
number of CPAs increased to approximately 90,000, and it is anticipated
that it should reach 120,000 by 1970.0 Moreover, during the period
1950-1960, membership in the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants ("AICPA"), the only national CPA society, grew from
15,800 to 37,400 members, an increase of 137 per cent." As of 1964
AICPA membership had reached approximately 51,000, and by 1970 it is
expected to have 70,000 members.8 2
To measure the relative improvement in the CPAs' professional status
in as precise terms as their numerical growth is an impossibility; however,
a generalization that their overall status is "demonstrably better than it
was twenty-five years ago"'ss can be alluded to by an analysis of objective
data other than mere economic success and growth.
Recognition of professional status is granted by all fifty states which
limit the use of the title "CPA" only to those who have met certain rigid
qualifications.8 4 Included in these requirements for qualifications in each
of these jurisdictions is the passage of the same uniform examination
77. 63 A.B.A. Rep. 570, 595 (1938). (Emphasis added.) (Italics omitted.)
78. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2286, at 537 (AlcNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
79. Stettler & Vanatta, Our Changing Profession, J. Accountancy, Oct. 1963, p. 53.
80. Carey, The CPA Plans for the Future 342-43 (1965).
81. Stettler & Vanatta, supra note 79.
82. Carey, op. cit. supra note 80.
83. Id. at 379.
84. Penney, The American Institute of CPAs--Past and Future, J. Accountancy, Jan. 1962,
p. 31, at 33.
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which is both thorough and difficult. This achievement of voluntary
uniformity by fifty state legislatures in testing professional prowess is
not only remarkable and without parallel, 8 but is also indeed moot evi-
dence of their high regard for the CPA profession.
The American Bar Association, recognizing that there are many areas
of tax law where the services of lawyers and CPAs overlap, approved a
statement of principles relating to the practice in the field of federal
income taxation promulgated by the National Conference of Lawyers and
Certified Public Accountants."6 In the preamble to the statement of
principles, the following recognition of the CPAs' competence was made:
In our present complex society, the average citizen conducting a business is
confronted with a myriad of governmental laws and regulations which cover every
phase of human endeavor and raise intricate and perplexing problems. These are
further complicated by the tax incidents attendant upon all business transactions.
As a result, citizens in increasing numbers have sought the professional services of
lawyers and certified public accountants. Each of these groups is well qualified to
serve the public in its respective field. The primary function of the lawyer is to
advise the public with respect to the legal implications involved in such problems,
whereas the certified public accountant has to do with the accounting aspects thereof.
Frequently the legal and accounting phases are so interrelated and interdependent
and overlapping that they are difficult to distinguish. Particularly is this true in the
field of income taxation where questions of law and accounting have sometimes
been inextricably intermingled. As a result, there has been some doubt as to where
the functions of one profession end and those of the other begin.8 7
In addition, evidence of high regard for the CPA profession can also
be found embodied in recent federal legislation. Previously, in order for
an individual to act as attorney or agent for a taxpayer in proceedings
before the Treasury Department, he had to be enrolled in accordance
with the regulations prescribed by the Director of Practice and had to
hold a power of attorney executed by the taxpayer."" A congressional
enactment on November 8, 1965, eliminated these special admission and
enrollment requirements for both attorneys and CPAs who are members
in good standing of their respective professions and who file written
declarations that they are currently qualified and authorized to act on
behalf of their clients.88
Finally, an independent survey conducted several years ago for the
AICPA documented the CPAs' reputation for integrity and high pro-
85. Ibid.
86. 76 A.B.A. Rep. 550-51 (1951). This statement of principles was also approved by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in the same year. J. Accountancy, June
1951, p. 869.
87. 76 A.B.A. Rep. 283 (1951).
88. See 6 CCH 1966 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ff 6029J.02.
89. 79 Stat. 1281, 5 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (Supp. I, 1965). See D.C. 230, 1966 Int. Rev. No.
37, at 20-21.
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fessional standards.9° This study was conducted through thorough inter-
views with presidents or chief executive officers of medium-sized manu-
facturing firms which retain independent public accountants. 0' The
results indicated, inter alia, that these executives generally held the
accounting profession with high regard, and instances of criticism were
relatively rare in comparison with similar surveys of attitudes toward
other professions.9'
This article will neither attempt to suggest the extent to which a uni-
form accountant-client privilege should be enacted, nor solve the many
problems that would accompany such creation. Not only has it been
questioned whether such a privilege is in the public interest, but there
is even a difference of opinion within the accounting profession itself
whether or not such a privilege should exist. 3 As is pointed out, however,
by John L. Carey, the Executive Director of the AICPA:
confidence that what is told an auditor in his professional capacity will be held inviolate
should not only enable him to obtain all the information necessary for the conduct
of an examination, but should place him in a position to perform the maximum
service to his client. This too is in the public interest.94
Despite disagreement on whether or not a general accountant-client
privilege is in the public interest, consideration should be given to the
much narrower issue of whether such a privilege is desirable in various
areas of state and federal tax practice. It is generally in this area that
the privilege protection is desired by accountants "as a protection to
clients who may be unjustly charged with fraud, or need to be protected
against fishing expeditions .... ,,1 In discussing this area of tax practice
-insofar as it relates to an attorney in the federal tax field-the court in
Colton v. United States9" stated:
There can, of course, be no question that the giving of tax advice and the preparation
of tax returns-which unquestionably constituted a very substantial part of the
legal services rendered the Matters by the Colton firm-are basically matters sufficiently
within the professional competence of an attorney to make them prima fade subject
to the attorney-client privilege.97
Implicit in this holding is the recognition that the attorney-clent privilege
in tax practice serves the public interest. Certainly, the public interest
would not change because these same services were performed by a CPA;
and, to hold otherwise is not only inconsistent, but would put the CPA at
90. What Manufacturers Think of CPAs, J. Accountancy, July 1963, p. 35.
91. Ibid.
92. Carey, op. cit. supra note 80, at 380.
93. Carey, Professional Ethics of Certified Public Accountants 167 (1956).
94. Ibid.
95. Carey, op. cit. supra note 80, at 327.
96. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
97. Id. at 637.
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a substantial competitive disadvantage with the attorney in rendering his
services in his permissible sphere of tax work. 8
To create even such a limited privilege in so many jurisdictions, how-
ever, would require substantial effort, support and planning. As a prac-
tical matter, such a task could only be effectively accomplished by a
unified effort by the AICPA in conjunction with all the state CPA
societies. Because this unity is so essential to the success of this venture,
any such efforts should first be preceded by an analytical study of this
entire area by the CPA profession itself. This study could serve as a
guide in determining the scope and aid in the drafting of such proposed
legislation. Keeping in mind that such a proposal must be made palatable
to diverse legislative bodies and withstand the understandable pressures
of competing professions seeking a similar privilege, the underlying
study should be thorough and broad, including, but not limited to, con-
sideration of such problems as:
(1) Should such legislation be limited solely to CPAs, or should it be
expanded to the accounting profession generally?
(2) Should such privilege apply to CPAs and/or accountants who are
not engaged in public accounting-for example, an accountant in
the accounting department of a large industrial corporation? 0
(3) In whose favor should the privilege inure-the accountant, the
client, or both?' 00
(4) Should certain areas be excluded completely from the privilege
regardless of the accountant's services, for example, bankruptcy
or criminal matters, etc.?
98. Although Wigmore opposes general recognition of an accountant-client privilege, 8
Wig-more, Evidence § 2286 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961), he does recognize a need for such
a privilege in administrative proceedings: "A correct test for recognizing professional
privilege would seem to be this: If the administrative department (bureau, board, com-
mission, etc.) requires an oath of office and prior proof of professional qualifications and
maintains a list of registered persons so qualified, or If in any other way its regulations
treat the special practitioners as a licensed body having the responsibility of attorneys and
subject to professional discipline, then the parties so represented are in the status of clients,
and the clients are therefore entitled to the appropriate consequences, Including the con-
fidentiality of communications. This is so whether the special practitioners are skilled In
the general body of law or only in the matter peculiar to the department. It should be
borne in mind throughout, however, that, since the privilege is intended for the benefit
of the client, the decision of this question mainly turns on the just interest of the party
represented, not on that of the person appearing for him." Id. § 2300(a), at 582. (Emphasis
omitted.) (Citation omitted.)
99. For a somewhat related problem which arose in the legal profession, see Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd on rehearing, 209 F.
Supp. 321 (NJ). 111. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
100. In Dorfman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1963), the court held that the
Illinois accountant privilege statute did not protect the client, but applied only to the
accountant himself.
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(5) Should any provision be made as to the legal title to the account-
ant's workpapers?' 01
(6) To which of the four general areas of accounting should this
privilege apply, namely: accounting, auditing, taxation and
management consulting services? In considering this problem, it
should be borne in mind that the accountant's services basically
consist of (i) external reports to outsiders and (ii) internal re-
ports, advice and assistance to management.10 2 In connection with
the former, consideration must be given to preservation of the
independent nature of said services, and to what extent divulgence
in such external reports constitutes a waiver of the underlying
confidential communication.
The study might-depending on the issue involved-consider dealing with
the aforementioned and other problems either by specific statutory pro-
vision, or by leaving the particular question open for judicial interpreta-
tion. If it is imperative that a particular problem be uniformly handled
in all jurisdictions, then it should be spelled out and not left to the chance
of varying and diverse judicial interpretations.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the law presently exists, no accountant privilege statute affords
adequate over-all protection to the confidential communications between
an accountant and his client. If it is imperative that such communications
be protected from divulgence before some future forum, it appears that
the prudent course would be to make such disclosures to the accountant
only upon the advice of counsel and in furtherance of said counsel's legal
services. In this manner the accountant could be considered an "em-
ployee" of the attorney, enabling such communications to the accountant
to qualify under the far broader privilege applicable between a client and
his attorney and employees thereof. As was cautioned in United States v.
Kovel, 03 however:
What is vital to the privilege is that the communication be made it confidence for
the purpose of obtaining egal advice from the lawyer. If what is sought is not legal
advice but only accounting service, as in Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795,
805-806 (9th Cir. 1954), see Reisman v. Caplin, 61-2 U.S.T.C. Par. 9673 (1961), or if
the advice sought is the accountant's rather than the lawyer's, no privilege exists.
We recognize this draws what may seem to some a rather arbitrary line between a
101. See Levy, Accountants' Legal Responsibility 53-59 (1954).
102. Carey, op. cit. supra note 80, at 126; cf. United States v. Bowman, 358 F.2d 421
(3d Cir. 1966). The Bowman decision applied the Pennsylvania accountant privilege statute
which excludes from its protection of CPA professional services "the examination of, audit
of or report on any financial statements, books, records or accounts which he may be engaged
to make or requested by a prospective client to discuss." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 9.11a
(Supp. 1965).
103. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
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case where the client communicates first to his own accountant (no privilege as to
such communications, even though he later consults his lawyer on the same matter,
Gariepy v. United States) and others, where the client in the first instance consults a
lawyer who retains an accountant as a listening post, or consults the lawyer with his
own accountant present. But that is the inevitable consequence of having to reconcile
the absence of a privilege for accountants and the effective operation of the privilege
of client and lawyer under conditions where the lawyer needs outside help.10 4
Moreover, although "the peculiar character of accountant's work papers
has raised questions which are not yet truly resolved,"' 05 it appears ad-
visable that any work product prepared by or materials given to the ac-
countant under such an arrangement should, by agreement, be retained
by the attorney so as to preserve their confidential nature and insure that
their production be sought from the attorney instead of the accountant.10
Such possession by either the individual taxpayer or his attorney-instead
of continued possession by the accountantl 7 --would hopefully shroud
these materials with the additional protection of said taxpayer's fifth
amendment privilege against incrimination. 08
104. Id. at 922. (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis omitted.)
105. Representations by Counsel at Formal Internal Revenue Interrogation, ABA Bull.,
Section of Taxation, April 1965, p. 37, at 42.
106. See Comment, supra note 59, at 260.
107. It has been suggested that an accountant, with proper representative authority,
should also be able to assert the taxpayer's constitutional rights. Cohen, Accountants' Work-
papers in Federal Tax Investigations, 21 Tax L. Rev. 183, 220 (1966).
108. As to the application of the fifth amendment privilege against incrimination to
individual taxpayers' cancelled checks and bank statements which were in their attorney's
possession, see United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). In rejecting the
government's attempt to subpoena such materials from the attorney (even though they were
unprotected by the attorney-client privilege because their transfer from the client did not
constitute a confidential communication), the court stated: "The government states that the
evil which the Fifth Amendment sought to prevent is not present when the prosecution seeks
evidence of A's guilt from B. But this argument ignores the realities of the relationship
existing where B is A's attorney. An attorney is his client's advocate. His function Is to raise
all the just and meritorious defenses his client has. No other 'third party,' nor 'agent,' nor
(representative' stands in such a unique relationship between the accused and the judicial
process as does his attorney. He is the only person besides the client himself who Is permitted
to prepare and conduct the defense of the matter under investigation. The attorney and his
client are so identical with respect to the function of the evidence and to the proceedings
which call for its production that any distinction is mere sophistry." Id. at 467. Cf. United
States v. Cohen, 250 F. Supp. 472 (D. Nev. 1965), which applied the privilege against In-
crimination, inter alia, to an accountant's workpapers (regardless of their ownership) which
were held by the taxpayer in his personal capacity in rightful and indefinite possession. On
the other hand, In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961), and Deck v. United States, 339
F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965), held that the delivery of such
workpapers to the taxpayer's counsel leaves them amenable to required production. These
cases were distinguished in the Cohen case, however, on the ground that "taxpayers in those
cases could not claim the rightful and indefinite possession, since the accountants, found to
have been the owners, had demanded that the work papers be given to the government
(Fahey) and that they be returned (Deck)." 250 F. Supp. at 475. (Italics omitted.)
